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MOZAMBIQUE
DEPLOYMENT
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29th February – 16th March 2000
Divisional Officer Phil Bailey - Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade
1.1 Following notification and a request for mobilisation by Home Office on Tuesday 29th February, a team of 15 fire service personnel along with a Divisional Officer was nominated to attend the flooding disaster at Mozambique.
The team make up was as follows;
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Philip Bailey |
Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade |
Field Commander |
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Clive Pugh |
Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade |
Team
Leader
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Alex Baum |
Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade |
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Roger Howells |
Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade |
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Andy Moffatt |
Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade |
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Robbie Jones |
Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade |
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Andy Methven |
South Wales Fire Service |
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Les Willey |
South Wales Fire Service |
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Mick Doherty |
Lancashire Fire & Rescue Service |
Team Leader |
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Andy Wilkinson |
Lancashire Fire & Rescue Service |
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John Mackie |
Lancashire Fire & Rescue Service |
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Ged Richmond |
Lancashire Fire & Rescue Service |
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Paul Brooks |
Lancashire Fire & Rescue Service |
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Martin Walsh |
Cheshire Fire Brigade |
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John Pugh |
Cheshire Fire Brigade |
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Gary Williams |
Cheshire Fire Brigade |
Mark Butler Mid and West Wales Fire Brigade
Stuart Hardacre Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service
The Fire Service team was part of a multi-disciplined team and the complete make up was:
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Martin Ogilvy |
Department For International Development |
Overall Team Leader |
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Chris Stewart |
Department For International Development |
Finance Officer |
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Nigel Appleby |
Department For International Development |
Procurement Officer |
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Chris Morrow |
Secondment |
Mozambique Advisor |
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Peter Carrington |
Secondment |
Air Operations |
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Royal National Lifeboats Institution |
8 Team Members |
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International Rescue Corps |
14 Team Members |
Two "Illyushin" aircraft had been secured and would fly via Athens, Jeddah and Mombassa finally arriving at Maputo in Mozambique. The flight was scheduled to take 22 hours.
OPERATIONS DIARY
2.1 Thursday 2/3/2000
The Fire Service teams rendezvoused with SDO Smith in the London area to complete visa applications for Mozambique. Forms were completed and left with SDO Smith for collation whilst the teams journeyed on to Manston, Kent.
Upon arrival 6 places were allocated to Fire Service personnel on the first flight. They would depart with Stn O Pugh in charge along with 14 IRC members and DFID personnel. The first flight would form an airhead at Maputo airport and await the remainder of the team that was scheduled to follow 24 hours later. SDO Smith arrived with passports and visas at 1730 and the aircraft departed.
The remainder of the team overnighted in Margate and the surrounding area.
The first flight arrived in Maputo at 1600 hours and the team manually unloaded the aircraft. Personnel were accommodated in a local hotel in Maputo with four team personnel providing security for equipment at the airfield overnight.
The remainder of the UKFSSART met in Manston in the early morning. It was agreed with Chris Stewart [DFID] to procure more provisions for transportation. Water, medical supplies and sun protection was purchased from local suppliers.
The RNLI team arrived early afternoon. HMI Pearn briefed the team before departure and clarified any points arising. The aircraft departed Manston at 1730.
The first flight / team at Maputo reloaded equipment onto a Belgian C130 for relocation to Beira the following day. Beira is Mozambique’s second city and is located approximately 400 miles north.
The second flight / team arrived at Maputo at 1600 and the team manually unloaded the aircraft. This was the first time the whole team was together in one location.
A briefing of officers was arranged for 2100 that evening. The consensus was that the UK contingent would relocate to Beira and operate by boat on the rivers Save and Buze. Up to date no other rescue teams, aid or assistance had been dispatched to this area, although it was known that the area had received major flood damage.
During the evening, Les Willey informed me that his passport did not contain a visa for Mozambique. DFID would endeavour to rectify this omission through the British Consulate.
Personnel were accommodated in a local hotel in Maputo with four team personnel providing security for equipment at the airfield overnight.
The plan for the day was to transport the team and equipment to Beira by a Belgian C130. This would involve three return trips.
By lunchtime it was evident that only two trips would be possible per day, therefore the operation was extended to the following day and six personnel would remain behind in Maputo.
On arrival at Beira a warehouse was secured for storage of equipment and aid. In contrast to Maputo, the airport was very quiet with only UN fixed wing aircraft and a South African Puma helicopter operating. Later in the day the German Border Guards and the Malawayan Army arrived with a total of three more Puma helicopters.
The whole team was accommodated at the Hotel Mozambique in the city of Beira.
Operations were divided into two sectors;
Both of these operations were extended from the team base at Beira. At this time it was evident from local reports that there was no search and rescue required and that operations had moved into supplying and assisting with aid.
Stn O Pugh liased with Medicins Du Monde [a Non Government Organisation] who offered a compound close to the beach at Beira for use to build and launch the boats from. The day was spent assembling and equipping the seven lifeboats. The conditions were extreme with temperatures reaching 40C and humidity levels were high. One RNLI member suffered heat stroke and required medical assistance. By the end of the day six boats had been assembled ready for use with the seventh being damaged and unserviceable for use.
Operations throughout the day highlighted the difficulty of logistics especially the procurement of transport, both to move equipment and personnel.
The mission for the next day was discussed and briefed in the hotel later in the evening.
The mission was to transport three doctors and medical aid by boat from Beira to the Goonda region. Four boats were to be utilised with 8 crew members [4 RNLI and 4 Fire crew] This would allow the boats to operate at the limits of their capability with only minimum refuelling planned. The journey would be a round trip of 160 miles and was programmed to last three days. No other craft had been able to pass the village of Buze because of the uncharted and shallow river course.
Helicopters were not operating in the area due to inaccessibility, poor landing sites and the unavailability of aircraft. It was agreed however that for safety reasons a helicopter would overfly the region at dusk to offer any assistance as and when required.
The teams would be self-sufficient on the river with a planned fuel dump being made available near Estaquenha. The four fire crew were selected to assist the RNLI crew in both boat handling and survival in the field. Satellite communications were made available via the RNLI crew.
2.6 Tuesday 7/3/2000
The whole team arose at 0300 in order to help launch the boats on a high tide. The launch had to take place on the beach, as no other launch sites were available. A flat bed lorry was procured to transport the boats to the beach, some 800m away.
During the first day the boat team reached the Mission at the village of Estaquenha. Stops were made en-route for the doctors to carry out their work and make future assessment needs of the area. No other aid workers had yet reached this area and no other boats had managed to pass the village of Buze. The UK boats were operating 30 miles past this point.
The remainder of the team busied themselves organising equipment at Beira airport. Following negotiations with aircrews by the two team leaders, Mick Doherty and Clive Pugh, personnel were utilised in loading and distributing aid to outlying villages by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft throughout the day.
The team was forced to vacate the hotel because the American contingent due in the next day had block booked all the rooms. Luckily an expatriate contacted a team member and offered an empty office complex complete with showers and air-conditioning for use for as long as required.
Les Willey’s passport was returned and no visa had been obtained. Following consultation with the British High Commission it was decided not to apply for a visa as the member was already in Country.
2.7 Wednesday 8/3/2000
The boat team operated further upstream, around the region of Goonda before making for Buze later in the day where the team overnighted. Again they visited outlying and remote villages offering medical aid and making assessments of future needs and requirements.
Again the remainder of the team were busied assisting with airlifts of aid and assistance including the medi-vac of two IRC personnel from the River Save region.
American and German forces arrived at the airfield to set up base for expected aircraft the following day.
2.8 Thursday 9/3/2000
The boat team returned to Beira mid morning whereupon the boats were recovered and made ready for use the following day. By this time a small trailer had been obtained which eased the task of launching and retrieving the boats from the beach.
A hot debrief revealed that the boats were capable of navigating the river and that further missions would be of benefit to the local communities.
A similar mission was planned for the following day with the boats remaining upriver for longer periods with relief crews being provided every 24 hours by air at Estaquenha.
The main American force arrived and as a result the airfield was finally mechanised making the loading and unloading of aircraft easier and more efficient. There were now 13 helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft operating locally from Beira.
The IRC team returned from Save and were billeted in an empty house in Beira.
2.9 Friday 10/3/2000
The boats were made ready for departure in the afternoon for a further mission to the Goonda area on the river Buze. On this occasion five boats would be utilised making full use of all available team members on a rota basis.
The boats departed at 1500 and made for Buze where the crews overnighted.
Fire crews again assisted in the dispatch and delivering of aid by air. Two of the aid boats complete with engines and fuel tanks were donated to Beira Fire station for use in future flooding incidents. Basic tuition and training was given to the on duty crew. The station commander who promised to put them to good use gratefully received the boats.
2.10 Saturday 11/3/2000
The boat crews departed Buze early morning and made for the Goonda region upriver. Again crews called at remote villages along the route. It should be noted that the river is difficult to navigate for the majority of the time. It is wide with fast flowing water. Reeds up to six feet high coupled with river banks as high as 29 feet made navigation and route finding difficult. Reliance was placed in the use of hand held GPS’s.
The remainder of personnel were employed by making ready boats, engines and tents for donation to NGO’s that was being arranged by Chris Morrow. It was now evident that the team would probably depart the following Wednesday and efforts were being made to donate boats and equipment to the agencies with greatest need.
The RFA supply ship Fort George complete with six "Sea King" helicopters arrived and anchored offshore. The helicopters began work immediately operating from the airfield and returning to the ship for refuelling.
At 1730 aircover was unable to contact the boat crews and they were not at the agreed RV point. The principal team members met and decided that it was unlikely that harm would have befallen all five boats, crews or engines. The weather was beginning to worsen with heavy tropical showers occurring. The prognosis was that the crews were probably seeking shelter from the weather along the river banks obscured from view by air. The American Airforce had nightime Search and Rescue capability and offered to provide a search at 2000 hours. Again the boats were not located.
DFID officials alerted London of the situation. Although concerned all personnel were aware that the boat crews were well equipped had local guides and translators and were able to survive unassisted for at least 48 hours. No satellite communications was provided for this mission. A further search would commence next day at first light.
2.11 Sunday 12/3/2000
The weather had worsened overnight and very heavy rain fell for the majority of the day. The first break in the weather that allowed safe air operations was at 1030 when the Americans again launched a helicopter to locate the missing boats. The boats were located at approximately 1130.It appeared that they had overshot the RV point and as a result the crew decided to pitch camp as daylight was failing. Communications with aircover was impossible as no helicopters ventured that far up river. The team commenced with boat operations and arranged for relief’s to be provided later in the day at 1600 hours as planned.
Relief crews rendezvoused as arranged at 1600 at Estaquehana.
2.12 Monday 13/3/2000
With improved helicopter provision, landing capability and receding floodwater it was decided to withdraw the boats and concentrate training NGO’s on their use in preparedness for when helicopters and aircover left the area in coming weeks.
The boat crews continued to work on the river throughout the day and planned their return to Beira for early evening before nightfall. The boats returned at 1700 having taken on several relief crew members at Buze.
Boats and engines were made ready in order to carry out training of NGO’s the next day.
2.13 Tuesday 14/3/2000
Today the teams concentrated on training organisations on boat handling and maintenance in readiness for DFID and the RNLI donating small craft and engines for use once the team had departed. Several fire service members volunteered to train the local works fire brigade in payment for the accommodation we had secured during the past week.
2.14 Wednesday 15/3/2000
All team members made ready to return to the UK later in the day. The RNLI crew would not be returning with us as they had made alternative arrangements to return via Johannesburg on a scheduled airline. This was unfortunate as good team building had taken place over the past two weeks and the majority of the team members, including RNLI personnel, were of the opinion that we should have all returned together as a team.
The "Aleutian" aircraft arrived at Beira at 1500 and was loaded within 30 minutes. The team departed for Manston via Mombassa and Cairo at 1830.
2.15 Thursday 16/3/2000
The team arrived at Manston 1030 and was met by Alan Mathews and SDO Peter Nixon. A hot debrief took place and arrangements were made to facilitate a full debrief in the near future. It was the Fire Service teams’ preference to hold the debrief at the FSC with a possible overnight stay.
All teams were met by Brigade representatives and were transported to home addresses.
Progress needs to be made on the provision of a corporate uniform. As field commander it was difficult for other organisations to recognise me as the OIC and personal contact was always required to be made on my part. I considered undress uniform but it was not appropriate for either the climate or conditions encountered.
My personal recommendation would be some form of robust workwear in the form of trousers and shirt, that rank insignia and identification patches can be displayed. I noted that Lancashire Fire Brigade personnel wore a coverall suit that was corporate to them showed rank insignia and team identification. Unfortunately conditions were too hot and humid to wear this uniform all the time throughout the day, and for that reason I suggest shirt and trousers.
I recommend that Fire service teams deployed overseas should be equipped with dedicated communications and not rely on other parties.
Mistakes were made due to misunderstanding and poor communication between leaders and team members. Initially briefings and instructions were left in most cases to memory.
I recommend that all instructions / briefings to team members regarding operations should be in a written form and handed to the team leader with a copy to remain with the field commander. This will avoid "chinese whispers" misunderstanding and confusion.