UNITED KINGDOM FIRE SERVICE SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAM
DEPLOYMENT TO INDIA - JANUARY 2001 - TEAM LEADER'S REPORT
DEPUTY CHIEF OFFICER MIKE THOMAS - LINCOLNSHIRE FB
1. Background
1.1 At 0846 (local time) (0346 GMT) on Friday 26th January 2001, an earthquake measuring 6.9 - 7 on the Richter scale occurred in the State of Gujurat, North West India. The epicentre was a few kilometres north of the city of Bhuj and the shock could be felt as far away as Delhi. Early reports indicated an area of damage that extended into the remote border areas of Pakistan. As a comparison an area the size of the UK was affected.
1.2 There are large population centres in Gujurat particularly Ahmedebad (7 million), Rajkot (2.5 million) and Bhuj (400k).
1.3 India was celebrating republic day at the time of the earthquake. This meant that the schools and public buildings were closed and that many people were at home.
1.4 The area has experienced earthquakes before, the last being in the early 1950's although this was being reported as the largest since 1819 when 1500 people perished. Early reports indicated a death toll of 20k across the region although with communication lines (land and cellular) disrupted, accurate information was scant.
1.5 The United Kingdom Fire Services Search & Rescue Team (UKFSSART) co-ordination centre at the Home Office were alerted at 0800 along with the other search & rescue agencies recognised by the DFID. At 1200 hours GMT (some 8hrs + after the earthquake) the on call rota teams UKFSSART were put on alert. The duty rota comprised of the following Brigades: Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Lincolnshire. Grampian were on call but were unable to respond. A team from Cheshire was nominated to attend in their stead. A search dog team from Leicestershire Fire & Rescue Service was also put on standby
1.6 The UKFSSAR team consisting of 29 members was supplemented by a further 30 members of International Rescue and Rapid UK.
2 Deployment
2.1 During the afternoon (GMT) on the day of the earthquake the UK teams were tasked with making preparations for attendance to India. Deputy Chief Fire Officer (DCFO) Mike Thomas, Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue was nominated as Team Leader.
2.2 At 1700 Mike Thomas was contacted by James Brown (DFID- Emergency Response Team of the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department) and advised the likelihood of deployment was about 80%. LFB Command Support Centre was advised and the Brigades contacted to gather the usual pre departure information of load details, weights, team member names etc. It was stressed that at that time no agreement had been reached with the Government of India (GoI) for Search & Rescue (SAR deployment. At 1945 DFID asked that all teams were mobilised to RAF Brize Norton. By 0230 all teams were in place and an RAF Tristar was loaded with the teams equipment.
2.3 Whilst at Brize Norton we were met by James Brown and Steve Ainsworth, DFID, who were to accompany the SAR teams and Rob Mcleod, CHAD who co-ordinated the deployment from the UK. The DFID teams regularly briefed the team leaders on progress with authority to deploy throughout the night. At 0750 hrs (GMT) Saturday 27th January the decision was finally made to take off and if necessary deploy to a staging point - probably Bahrain. Whilst waiting on the tarmac for clearance to take off the final authorisation to deploy to India was given.
2.4 The team arrived in Ahmedebad, Gujurat, at 2330 (local time). James Brown liaised with the local authorities and we were tasked to Bhuj. The DFID representatives on the ground had organised three lorries and four local buses to transport the teams and their equipment to Bhuj.
2.5 Progress was slow principally due to the nature of the infrastructure. As we neared the epicentre the extent of the devastation became evident. There were thousands of displaced people in the roads and in the towns we passed through on route the collapse of buildings and damage to the infrastructure was extensive. The teams arrived in Bhuj at 1430 hrs.
2.6 It was evident that the Indian Army was busy at work. The majority of the buildings were still standing although clearly had suffered severe damage making them untenable. Approx. 10% had totally collapsed. The buildings were of mixed construction with many of the apartment blocks of reinforced concrete slab whilst many of the smaller (one and two storey) were of brick/concrete block. Many of those that had collapsed had 'pancaked'. Buildings in the 'old town' (centre) approx 2 sq.km where 10% of the population was reported to have lived had totally collapsed including many of the religious centres.
2.7 Whilst the Team Leader made contact with the Collector (and met the Minister of the Interior) and the State Police who were co-ordinating the rescue and recovery effort one team immediately deployed to a building where live contact had been reported. The remaining teams established a camp on the green adjacent to the collapsed town hall. Prior to arrival one member from each team had been identified to form a support team. Their role was to establish the camp and record events, organise water, food, interpreters and transport.
2.8 In the absence of any other international arrangements a command and communications centre was established within the camp close to the police station.
2.9 At this time the UK teams were the first international rescuers. The Swiss Red Cross rescuers had arrived in Ahmedebad some hours prior to the UK team and were deployed to that city itself. There were no other UN personnel in the country at that time.
3 Search & Rescue Operations
3.1 As identified above the team immediately deployed found a casualty and safely rescued a male. In all the days we were deployed some 75 buildings were searched, many at the request of the Indian authorities as well as those reported directly to the team. In total six persons were found and released by UK teams. A further three persons were rescued by teams working from the UK camp under command of the UK structure.
3.2 On the first and early on the second day, the team had to organise either Police or local people to transport the teams to collapsed sites in the city and to interpret where necessary. That ad hoc arrangement was replaced with state officials taking over providing the assistance required. To this end the teams had up to five four-wheel drive vehicles available and each team had access to an interpreter.
3.3 Regular meetings each day were held with both the Collector and State Police to ensure the UK rescue effort was meeting the defined needs and we were properly interfacing with the local structures. The Police and local population organised delivery of bottled water and fresh fruit to the camp.
3.4 Rescue efforts were hampered in the early days with the lack of specialist heavy lifting equipment. However the Indian Army Engineers were able to organise additional equipment that began to arrive in large quantities late Tuesday and Wednesday. This allowed the teams to revisit some of the buildings that had been likely to contain voids where casualties may be trapped alive but had been impossible to reach.
3.5 On Tuesday the UK teams were supplemented with the arrival of 35 Turkish rescuers and Japanese search dogs followed some hours later by French search dogs. All agreed to be co-ordinated in the their efforts through the UK structure. Contact was also made with both German (THW) and Russian teams operating in the same region.
3.6 On Tuesday at the request of the Police a recce team was sent to the town of Ghandi Dam (50 km south) where it was reported no rescue effort had been made. A team of four under the Field Commander accompanied by two Japanese search dogs went in Police vehicles to the town. On arrival they reported to the Police who took the team to a few buildings where they required confirmation that no signs of life existed. It became apparent other teams had been in the town.
3.7 A meeting took place each evening involving all the team leaders at which the welfare and health of the teams was discussed as well as the progress and effectiveness of the UK team. On the Tuesday evening, after a day of limited success, it was decided that the UK could begin to scale down its operations given the arrival of fresh resources. This was extended a further day following another successful live rescue. At 1800 hours Wednesday the teams stood down and took a well earned rest although they were still available to assist the other rescuers if required.
3.8 On Thursday the teams broke camp and prepared for departure back to Ahmedebad.
4. Return to the UK
4.1 At 1500 hrs (local time) Thursday 1st February the teams left the camp in Bhuj by coach to Ahmedebad. Before departure the teams left a considerable amount of rescue equipment as well as tents, sleeping bags and cooking facilities. The rescue equipment was donated by the teams to the Indian Army rescuers. The remainder of the equipment went to the local charities in order to support some of the displaced population.
4.2 The 10 hr journey back to Ahmedebad was without incident and the team arrived back in the UK at 1100 hrs Friday 2nd February at Manchester Airport.